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n this paper, I discuss transparency in the con-
duct of monetary policy from three perspectives.
First, I look at why central banks have chosen
to become more transparent in recent years. I then
set out the measures taken by the Bank of Canada
to increase transparency. The third section of the
paper examines a number of issues that could be
grouped under the heading “Are there limits to
what should be made public?”
WHY HAVE CENTRAL BANKS BECOME
INCREASINGLY TRANSPARENT?
There are two key factors behind the move to
increased transparency on the part of central banks.
The first is the relationship between transparency
and the effectiveness of monetary policy. The second
is the link between transparency and accountability.
Let me examine each of these motivations in turn.
The way in which monetary policy is conducted
by central banks has changed significantly in recent
years. Not too long ago, central banks said relatively
little about their monetary policy and allowed their
actions to speak for themselves. Today, in contrast,
central banks are very explicit in setting out the
objectives of policy, the way in which they view the
operation of the transmission mechanism between
their policy actions and their goal variables, their
outlook for economic activity and inflation, and their
setting of the policy interest rate. It is now generally
believed in the central banking community that this
increased transparency improves the functioning
of monetary policy in a number of dimensions.
The first dimension involves the understanding
of the general public, both directly and through the
media. Like all public policies, monetary policy
benefits from increased public support and under-
standing. In particular, monetary policy, which at
times involves the need to take tightening actions
to prevent the economy from overheating, would
find itself the subject of considerable public criticism
if the public did not understand the reason for its
actions. The key point in developing such an under-
standing is to make clear what monetary policy
can do, as well as what it cannot do. Thus, central
banks should emphasize that the role of monetary
policy is to control inflation in the medium-to-long
run1 and that an environment of low inflation will
help the economy to achieve a higher level or rate
of growth of productivity. Moreover, a monetary
policy aimed at inflation control will tend to moder-
ate the economic cycle, although it cannot eliminate
it. In focusing on these benefits, the central bank
should make clear that the objective of low inflation,
or price stability, is a means to an end, the end being
a well-functioning economy, and not an end in itself.
Examples from postwar economic history that focus
on the poor performance of the economy at times
of high inflation and its better performance at times
of low inflation can be very helpful in this regard.
In addition to generating broad public support
for the goal of low inflation, transparency (along
with the credibility of policy) can contribute to
behavior that will facilitate the achievement of the
goal. Thus, wage and price setting that is done in
the context of an environment of confidently held
expectations of low and stable inflation will make
the task of the central bank easier.
The second dimension of the relationship
between transparency and the functioning of
monetary policy involves the behavior of participants
in financial markets. When financial markets under-
stand and anticipate the actions of the central bank,
the first steps in the transmission mechanism
between policy actions and economic activity and
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1 This could be done in the context of an explicit inflation target (as in
Canada) or a more general commitment to low inflation (as in the
United States).For example, when the central bank and market
participants have a similar interpretation of factors
affecting the economic outlook, data releases will
tend to lead to movements in market interest rates
(and the exchange rate) in advance of, and consis-
tent with, the policy actions that are subsequently
taken by the central bank. Thus, new data indicating
increased pressures on capacity and, hence, an
increased likelihood of higher future inflation will
result in higher interest rates across much of the
yield curve, while signs of weakness in the economy
and an increased likelihood of lower future inflation
will result in lower interest rates.
I would emphasize at this point that central
banks should not and do not simply follow the mar-
ket. If views differ between the central bank and the
market as to the likely outlook and the appropriate
policy, the central bank must follow its own best
judgment and explain to the market the reasons
for its actions. But the enhanced transparency and
improved communications of recent years reduce
the likelihood of sharply different views as to appro-
priate policy, although they do not entirely elimi-
nate it. In short, if market expectations are broadly
in line with the direction of policy, there is likely to
be less volatility in financial markets and smoother
incorporation of policy actions into interest rates
and exchange rates.
Communications play an important role in the
transmission of the views of the central bank to the
public and to markets. Hence, a great deal of atten-
tion is now paid to the way that central banks pre-
sent their key messages (see Blinder et al., 2001, and
Jenkins, 2001). Improving the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy through greater transparency requires
proactive and well-planned communications.
The second key factor motivating the trend to
greater transparency is the tendency toward greater
accountability, an important element in the frame-
work supporting the independence of central banks.
On this, I can be brief. Increasingly around the
world, central banks are being given responsibility
for carrying out monetary policy in the context of
objectives that are defined in legislation or treaty
and/or agreed upon by the government and central
bank. As nonelected bodies, central banks are typi-
cally held accountable to government or parliament
or the general public for their stewardship of policy.
In order for this accountability to be effective, the
oversight body must have sufficient information to
evaluate the conduct of policy by the central bank.
Such information is provided by central banks in
the context of their overall communications strategy,
and the need to provide this information has played
an important role in the increased transparency of
monetary policy.
HOW HAS THE BANK OF CANADA
BECOME MORE TRANSPARENT?
While I now turn to the ways in which the
Bank of Canada has become more transparent in
recent years, I would note that similar (although not
identical) changes have been put in place in most
central banks. Changes in the direction of increased
transparency can be grouped under a number of
headings—the goal of policy, the transmission
mechanism, the outlook, the policy instrument,
and the means by which the Bank communicates
information.
Goal of Policy
In February 1991, the Bank of Canada and the
government of Canada publicly announced their
jointly agreed inflation-control targets. The initial
targets aimed at a gradual reduction of the target
rate of inflation from 3 percent at the end of 1992
to 2 percent at the end of 1995. Since then the targets
have been renewed three times, each time with a
target range centered on 2 percent. The most recent
agreement, announced earlier this year, extended
the 2 percent target to the end of 2006. The move
to a five-year term for the agreement (from the
three-year term in previous agreements) is aimed
at enhancing the longer-term predictability of the
rate of inflation.
The range for the target has been plus or minus
1 percent throughout. The Bank has also been very
explicit that the horizon for bringing inflation back
to the target midpoint if it moves away from that
level would be six to eight quarters. While the target
has been defined in terms of the 12-month rate of
increase of the total consumer price index (CPI), the
Bank has used a publicly announced measure of
core inflation as a policy guide in assessing future
inflation developments.
Transmission Mechanism
The Bank of Canada has explained in some
detail the way in which it views the transmission
mechanism from its policy actions to market interest
rates and the exchange rate, and then to output and
inflation (see Thiessen, 1995). It has also published
a number of articles on the large macroeconomic
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(Poloz, Rose, and Tetlow, 1994), that currently pro-
vides the basis (combined with staff judgment) for
the principal staff projection. An alternative view
of the transmission mechanism focuses on the
way that developments in the monetary aggregates
directly affect the spending behavior of households
and businesses. (See Engert and Selody, 1998, and
Laidler, 1999, for expositions of this approach.) The
various multi-equation and single-equation models
linking monetary aggregates to economic activity
have also been made public. And the Bank has
explained how the staff projection, the monetary-
based forecasts, and the information gathered by
the Bank’s regional offices (through formal surveys
and anecdotally) are integrated in the course of
making monetary policy decisions (see Longworth
and Freedman, forthcoming).
Economic and Inflation Outlook
Central banks differ in the degree of detail that
they publish on their economic and inflation out-
look. And they also differ in the interest rate and
exchange rate conventions that underlie their
projections.
The Bank of Canada presents a detailed discus-
sion of recent economic and inflation developments
as well as its outlook for the future once per quarter
either in its monetary policy report (in April and
October) or in its update (in January and July). The
outlook typically focuses on expected developments
over the next 6 to 18 months in gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), the output gap, total CPI, and core CPI.
A qualitative assessment is given of the risks sur-
rounding the outlook, but there is no attempt to
quantify the risks.
Speeches by the Governor and other members
of the Governing Council of the Bank are used to
sketch out changes in the outlook between publi-
cations. As well, a press release is issued on each of
the eight preannounced fixed action dates, whether
or not the policy interest rate is changed, and this
gives the Bank a further opportunity to give some
sense of its views of likely future developments in
the economy and inflation.
Policy Interest Rate
Until a few years ago, markets had to infer a
central bank’s target for the policy interest rate from
its actions, and it was not always immediately clear
from these actions whether or not the policy rate
target had changed. Now, the target for the policy rate
is announced explicitly, normally on preannounced
dates, almost everywhere.
In Canada, there were a number of changes
that made the setting of the policy interest rate
increasingly transparent. In 1994, the Bank estab-
lished an operational target band of 50 basis points
for the overnight interest rate. Market participants
recognized a change in the rate when the Bank
informed them of its intention to intervene at the
new limits of the band (using repos or reverse repos
to enforce those limits). In early 1996, the Bank
began to issue a press release whenever there was
a change in the band, giving an explanation for the
change. Shortly thereafter, the Bank Rate (the rate
charged by the Bank on advances to participants in
the payments system) was set at the top of the band.2
In 1999, the target rate was explicitly set as the
midpoint of the band. With the movement to fixed
announcement dates in late 2000, a press release
was issued on each date regardless of whether or
not there was a change in the policy rate.
Communications
The Bank now aims at an integrated communi-
cations strategy in order to disseminate its key mes-
sages to the various target audiences throughout
the year. As noted earlier, each year this involves
two monetary policy reports, two updates to the
report, eight press releases on the fixed announce-
ment dates, and speeches by the Governor and other
members of the Governing Council (in many cases
as part of a regional outreach program). In addition,
there are background briefings, press conferences
with the Governor following the release of the report
and the update, and testimony by the Governor
before the House of Commons Finance Committee
following the publication of each report.
In recent years, the Bank has instituted a media
“lock-up” arrangement in which the media can read
key Bank reports and write their stories prior to the
official publication time, for release at that time.
As well, there are regular media briefings during
the lock-up, where officials can deal with techni-
cal questions and clarify other issues (on an un-
attributed basis) for the media that are present.
The result has been a clear improvement in the
quality of the reporting compared with the period
when the media received the reports at the official
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2 It had previously been set equal to the average rate on Treasury bills
at the weekly auction plus 25 basis points.release time and the wire services competed to get
out the first headline.
The establishment of the fixed announcement
dates has also had a beneficial effect on the discus-
sion surrounding Canadian monetary policy by both
journalists and market commentators. Whereas pre-
viously there had been a tendency for the discussion
to center on whether or not the Bank would follow
the Fed’s movements, the focus has shifted to what
is appropriate for the Canadian economy in its cur-
rent and prospective economic circumstances.3
ARE THERE LIMITS TO WHAT SHOULD
BE MADE PUBLIC?
On the surface, this seems like an odd question.
Can there ever be too much of a good thing? But
as one reflects on the nature of transparency and
communications, it becomes clear that certain steps
in the direction of increased transparency could
actually be counterproductive. Let me begin with an
admittedly extreme example, turn to the principle
at issue, and then return to some examples.
Should the policymaking body’s deliberations
before its decisions be televised or Web-cast? Even
strong proponents of transparency come to the
conclusion that such an initiative could be harmful
for a number of reasons. First, policymakers could
be inhibited from taking different points of view in
the course of the discussion (i.e., playing devil’s
advocate). Second, it would make it more difficult
for them to change their minds on the appropriate
decision for the policy interest rate as the debate
progressed and as different perspectives on the
issue were discussed, since they would appear to
be “waffling” on the decision. Third, making the
deliberations public would likely lead to participants
making more formal presentations (with perhaps a
more entrenched initial position), replacing the
more informal discussion in which the dynamic
of the debate plays an important role in arriving at
a decision.4 In short, the view that opening the
deliberations to the public could well lead to a
deterioration in the quality of the decisionmaking
process has acted to prevent such a development
even in those central banks that are the most enthu-
siastic supporters of transparency. (See Blinder et al.,
2001, for a detailed discussion of this issue.)
Let me now examine the question of the limits
of transparency from a broader perspective, drawing
on an interesting and insightful paper by Bernhard
Winkler (2000) of the European Central Bank (ECB).
Winkler argues (p. 18) that “in a world where—
unlike in most standard economic models—cognitive
limits matter, more information and greater detail
does not by itself translate into greater transparency
and better understanding, nor does it necessarily
lead to more efficient decision-making.” Winkler
notes that there are several aspects of transparency,
which may possibly conflict with each other. These
include (i) openness, or the amount and precision
of information provided; (ii) clarity in the presenta-
tion and interpretation of information; (iii) common
understanding by the sender and receiver of infor-
mation; and (iv) honesty, or the correspondence of
the internal framework of analysis with the presen-
tation used for external communication.
As an example of potential conflict, we can com-
pare openness and clarity. Central bank projections
typically produce time paths for dozens or even
hundreds of economic variables. Yet most central
banks communicate to the public their quantitative
outlook only for the broadest economic measures,
such as output and inflation.5 This reflects the view
that increased openness, in the sense of presenting
enormous amounts of detail, would reduce the
clarity of the central bank’s message about future
developments rather than increase it.
In passing, I would note that one issue that all
central banks are struggling with is how to charac-
terize and communicate the risks around their base-
line case forecast. Some, such as the Bank of England
and the Riksbank, present a form of probability
distribution that is intended to indicate the variance
around the central forecast. Others, such as the
Federal Reserve and the Bank of Canada, are more
qualitative in their presentation of the balance of
risks. But I do not think that any central bank has
been completely successful thus far in communicat-
ing the nature of the risks surrounding its outlook
for the economy and inflation.
The notion of “honesty” in the correspondence
of the internal framework of analysis and external
communications also gives rise to some interesting
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from the movement to fixed announcement dates.
4 Presentations at FOMC meetings by Board members and Reserve Bank
presidents appear to have become somewhat more formal since 1993.
In the fall of that year, the FOMC was made aware that the transcripts
of the tape recordings of the meetings since March 1976 had been
retained. The FOMC subsequently decided that lightly edited verbatim
transcripts of the meetings would be released with a five-year delay.
5 There is often considerable qualitative discussion of some of the com-
ponents of these broad measures, but most central banks do not give
precise estimates of their projections of these components.
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markets, would like central banks to be more explicit
in setting out their reaction function to various
contingencies. But central banks, while they spend
a lot of time considering the appropriate response
to various shocks, do not have an explicit, quantita-
tive pre-agreed reaction function for every type of
shock. To quote John Vickers (1998, pp. 370-71):
In situations of any complexity, there is a
tension between a complete contract (i.e. one
that specifies what is to happen in every
eventuality) and having a good contract
(i.e. one that entails good decisions in every
eventuality). If the same is true for policy
reaction functions, then residual discretion
is sensible and so residual uncertainty is
inevitable.
One reason that it is not possible to develop a
simple reaction function is that there is no model
of the economy that is universally accepted.6 With
model uncertainty, there cannot be a simple reaction
function, especially when different weights are
attached to the projections from the various models
in different circumstances. In this context I would
note that one of the perceived advantages of the
Taylor rule is that it is robust across models. But
while the Taylor rule can be useful as an indicator
of policy in many circumstances, it is not a reaction
function that sets out a monetary policy response
to all contingencies. A second reason that there
cannot be a simple reaction function is that the
information used in coming to a decision involves
more variables than can be incorporated in any
such function. For example, in the early 1990s, the
reluctance of commercial banks to extend loans
(Chairman Greenspan’s “headwinds”) played an
important role in the Fed’s conduct of policy. More
recently, the increased rate of growth of productivity
operated through a number of channels to affect
economic behavior and thereby to influence the
Fed’s decisionmaking. And, currently, the confidence
of firms and households in light of the terrorist
attacks of September 11 is playing an important role.
While a simple relationship such as a Taylor rule
can be a helpful guide to policymaking, it cannot
incorporate all the factors that feed into the decision-
making process (especially in an open economy).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Central banks have come a long way in recent
years in the direction of increased transparency.
And this has been very helpful in improving the
effectiveness of monetary policy and enhancing
the accountability of the central bank.
But there continue to be interesting challenges
as to future directions in which central banks should
go. How much detail should be included in the out-
look? Whose forecast is being released—that of the
staff (as in the case of the ECB) or that of the policy-
making body (as in the case of the Bank of England)?
What convention, if any, should be used for the
interest rate path on which the outlook is based?7
How does the central bank communicate most
effectively that its outlook is conditional on current
information and that the outlook will change as
new information is received? How can it best com-
municate the risks and uncertainties surrounding
its outlook?
In my view, the central bank’s approach to
answering each of these questions should be based
on an analysis of what would be most effective in
enhancing the understanding of the public, the
markets, and the media. This may be different in
different countries. And it may change over time as
the sophistication of the targeted audiences
changes.
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My remarks reflect more my political experience
during the last decade, after the fall of communism
in my country and elsewhere, than any well-defined
theoretical position.
As I see it, transparency does not represent the
main and most important issue of monetary policy.
Transparency itself is undoubtedly a positive feature,
but to concentrate on transparency without taking
into consideration other things means missing, if
not hiding, something that is more relevant.
In my understanding, the more relevant issues
or the prior issues are the quality of the monetary
regime and the way in which monetary policy
reflects the preferences of society. An error in either
of them is very costly.
Let me start with the second issue, with the
problem of the independence of the central bank.
I must admit I have a problem with it—as some-
one who, as minister of finance, introduced it into
my country. I can probably afford to make such a
“politically incorrect” statement here because I have
some justification for it. In the communist era, we
were—among other things—dreaming about rational
monetary policy and we considered the indepen-
dence of a central bank to be a necessary precon-
dition for it. Now, after 12 years of its absolute
independence in my country, I see this issue in a
more complicated way. I see it as a principal-agent
problem. There are many arguments that the central
bank should be just an agency that operates to meet
policy objectives set by society or its legal represen-
tatives. In accordance with this view, the indepen-
dence of a central bank should be limited to the
independence in choosing instruments, not policy
objectives. This is not, however, the case in my coun-
try. Transparency is, therefore, not the main issue.
Looking at the title of this discussion, we are
supposed to speak not about monetary regimes but
about monetary policy. Nevertheless, it seems to me
that there is a difference in transparency between
the regime of discretionary monetary policy and
the regime of policy of rules. Discretionary policy
cannot be—perhaps even should not be—transparent
(as I understand transparency).
My personal experience with pegged exchange
rate policy, which was considered to be the most
suitable policy for transition economies 10 years
ago, is not a good one. I was very much afraid of
accepting it at the end of 1990, but at that time the
International Monetary Fund did not listen to any
arguments in this respect. This policy, however, in
the first half of the 1990s brought about (or at least
made possible) better economic fundamentals in
my country than in other transition economies. It
Václav Klaus, former finance minister and prime minister, is the
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was, however, undermined by the premature intro-
duction of full convertibility of the Czech crown
and by the resulting (or perhaps parallel, but inde-
pendent) large inflow of foreign capital into the
country. This coincidence of events led, of course,
to the excessive growth of the money supply.
Our central bank tried not to be passive and
started to interfere with the money supply, which
was an expected error. The combination of two
different rules (or regimes) whether in a transparent
or nontransparent way—pegged exchange rate
and monetary targeting—had very unpleasant
consequences.
To return to our topic, we can say that the policy
of pegged exchange rates was transparent, but in
the world of global massive movements of capital
it contained inherent risks. When investors lose trust
in the currency and start speculative attacks against
it, the pegging must be abandoned, which is not
costless. The transition from one type of monetary
rule to another is connected with instability, which is
especially true for a small, open, transition economy
with weak and shallow markets. 
Our country finally moved to inflation targeting
which is, in a favorable interpretation, a more com-
plex policy regime than a simple monetary targeting
or pegged exchange rate regime. In another inter-
pretation, it is a resignation on accountable policy.
It requires using the whole mix of central bank
instruments, but no one knows in advance which
of them will be used. In this respect, inflation target-
ing is not transparent and our experience forces
me to argue that its results (at least its short-term
results) are very dubious.
The Czech experience demonstrates that pegged
exchange rate policy is suitable before deregulation
of capital flows, whereas, after it, floating is inevit-
able. It shows as well the problems of inflation target-
ing in a transition economy. Our central bank did
not have sufficient experience with monetary policy
and, in addition, chose an extremely low inflation
target which slowed down the economy too much.
After that we could not get out of deflation. 
Inflation targeting can have meaning only on
condition of hitting the inflation target, which in
our case was not done. The missing of the target
was enormous; instead of 6 percent inflation we
got deflation. Somebody could argue that it was a
mistake, but I am not so sure.
To conclude, transparency has a meaning and
plays a positive role only when all other precondi-
tions of monetary policy are in place.
Transparency in the Practice
of Monetary Policy
J. Alfred Broaddus Jr.
This has been a very useful conference in my
view, and I am honored by this opportunity to be a
part of it. As some of you may know, I was the second
choice for this slot, but that doesn’t bother me at
all because the first choice was Don Brash, the
Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and
a pathbreaker in bringing both transparency and
accountability to central banking in practice. I won’t
be able to fill Don’s shoes completely, but I have a
strong interest in this topic, and I am very happy that
Bill and Dan saw fit to give me the opportunity to
share some thoughts with this distinguished group.
Actually, it is hard to imagine that anyone inter-
ested in improving the conduct of monetary policy
would not be interested in this topic. There is a
growing consensus among monetary economists
at this point that the impact of monetary policy on
expenditure is transmitted primarily through the
effects of policy actions on expectations regarding
the future path of short-term interest rates rather
than the current level of the overnight rate (see
Woodford, 2001, p.17). Further, the more financial
markets know about the reasons for a central bank’s
current policy actions and its longer-run policy
intentions, the more likely it is that market reactions
to policy actions will reinforce these actions and
increase the effectiveness of stabilization policy. It
follows that central banks should be highly transpar-
ent regarding both their long-term policy objectives
and the shorter-term tactical actions they take with
policy instruments.
Against this background, it seems to me that
the Fed, along with other central banks, has made
considerable progress in increasing transparency
J. Alfred Broaddus Jr. is the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond. The author thanks his colleague Marvin Goodfriend for
assistance in preparing these remarks. The views expressed here are
the author’s and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.in recent years. When I first joined the Fed back in
1970, to the extent that anyone thought explicitly
about transparency issues at all, the idea seemed
to be that limited transparency—or even no trans-
parency—was best. Central banks in industrial
democracies were thought to work most effectively
behind the scenes, away from the glare of public
scrutiny, at least in part because they could then
quietly take appropriate actions that might be
politically unpopular or, more broadly, difficult to
explain to a public not well versed in the intrica-
cies of finance (see Goodfriend, 1986). There was
also a belief in some quarters that central banks
could enhance the effects of certain policy actions—
most notably foreign exchange market intervention
operations—if they kept market participants uncer-
tain about their intentions.
Attitudes toward transparency appeared to
change in the 1980s, partly reflecting progress made
by economists in understanding the monetary policy
transmission mechanism, and probably partly
because of public demand, particularly in the United
States, for greater openness in government and
public policy in general. (As you may recall, the
most widely read popular book about the Fed and
Fed policy in the 1980s was somewhat derisively
titled Secrets of the Temple.) Further, in the early
1980s Chairman Volcker publicly took responsibility
for reducing inflation from its then high level, and
subsequently took strong and temporarily painful
actions to accomplish the reduction. Some public
explanation of the need for these steps was required,
and this need probably facilitated the transition to
viewing transparency in a more favorable light. In
any case, given the normal resistance to change in
bureaucratic organizations, I believe the Fed has
made remarkable progress over the last decade or
so in opening up its conduct of monetary policy to
market and public scrutiny.
Since the Fed is now quite open regarding many
important aspects of its policy strategy and opera-
tions, and in view of the strong performance of the
U.S. economy in recent years, at least up until the
last several quarters, one might reasonably ask
whether still greater transparency is necessary or
even desirable in U.S. monetary policy. I think it is,
and I will try to make this case in the next few min-
utes. Let me comment briefly on four points: (i) the
transparency of our long-term inflation objective,
(ii) what I’m going to refer to as the “intermediate-
term transparency problem,” (iii) the transparency
of our policy directive including its “tilt,” and (iv)
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the role of testimony, speeches, and other public
statements by Fed officials in providing transparency.
TRANSPARENCY OF THE LONG-TERM
INFLATION OBJECTIVE
Probably the most important thing about Fed
monetary policy that the public wishes to know
and needs to know with some precision is our long-
term objective for inflation. Longer-term inflation
expectations are obviously critical to households
and businesses in committing to long-term invest-
ments, home purchases, insurance contracts, and
wage and benefit agreements. Conversely, the Fed
needs the public to understand and trust its long-
term commitment to low inflation to achieve max-
imum benefit from this long-term strategy.
How to convey this objective credibly to the
markets and the public has been a major focus of
our policy research at the Richmond Fed for a long
time. For many years I’ve personally been convinced
that controlling inflation should be the Fed’s over-
riding objective, that this objective should be explicit,
and that it should be supported by a Congressional
mandate. At one level, abstracting, for example, from
political obstacles, this seems obvious. We know
that the Fed has the ability to determine the long-run
inflation rate with monetary policy, and theoretical
analysis and all of our practical experience suggests
we should use that power in the public interest to
maintain low and stable inflation over time. 
An explicit long-term inflation objective sup-
ported by a Congressional mandate would be a
substantially beneficial step, in my view, even if it
were limited to a verbal statement along the lines
of the language in the proposed Neal Amendment
to the Federal Reserve Act (see Black, 1990, and
Greenspan, 1990). Quantifying the objective in
terms of an explicit numerical rate (say, 2 percent
per annum using the core personal consumption
expenditures [PCE] inflation index) would make
the objective even more transparent and probably
more effective.
Committing to an explicit inflation objective
would achieve at least three things. First, it would
help anchor longer-term inflation expectations and
therefore facilitate the longer-term transactions I
noted earlier. Second, it would help prevent inflation
scares in financial markets, which would allow the
Fed to act more aggressively in response to down-
side risks in the economy with less concern that
rising long-term interest rates might neutralize the
effect of the action. Third, and most importantly, an explicit inflation
objective would discipline the Fed to explain and
justify short-run actions designed to stabilize out-
put and employment against our commitment to
protect the purchasing power of the currency over
the long run. An explicit objective would force such
explanations and justifications to be more sharply
focused than in the current regime without such
an objective. Routine, clear explanations of short-
term actions would build confidence in the Fed’s
commitment to price stability and over time help
reinforce credibility for low inflation. If the expla-
nations were made in testimony before Congress,
supplemented perhaps by a written inflation report
along the lines of the Bank of England model,
Congress would be positioned to enforce an account-
ability for monetary policy that arguably is now
weaker in the United States than in the United
Kingdom and the European Monetary Union.
One final point here: The Fed’s long-term com-
mitment to price stability is now largely embodied
in our current Chairman’s demonstrated commit-
ment to this objective, rather than being institution-
ally grounded in an explicit objective. It is therefore
inherently tenuous, since its continuance will
depend on the preferences of future chairmen and
their susceptibility to political pressure to pursue
other goals.
For all these reasons, it seems clear to me that
the increased transparency that would be provided
by an explicit long-term inflation objective would
increase the probability that we will attain our goal
over time. Some argue strongly for a dual objective
that refers explicitly to output or employment as
well as inflation. But both theory and experience
indicate that the Fed cannot control real variables
directly with monetary policy, and in my view there
are reasonable grounds to presume that the Fed will
optimize its contribution to the economy’s overall
performance by maintaining credibility for low infla-
tion (see Goodfriend and King, 2001). A unitary goal
focused on low inflation would strengthen credibil-
ity by making the Fed’s commitment to this objective
definite and unambiguous.
It is one thing to advocate an explicit inflation
objective; it is another to actually put one in place.
I doubt seriously that an explicit objective set and
announced unilaterally by the Fed would be credi-
ble. Any explicit inflation objective would need to
be accepted by the government as a whole through
legislation or some other formal agreement, as such
objectives are in countries that employ them. With its
public standing high, the Fed seems well positioned
currently to make the case for such a mandate.
INTERMEDIATE-TERM ISSUES
Even if the Fed obtains a price stability mandate,
transparency issues are still likely to arise in prac-
tice—specifically, when current inflation or near-
term inflation projections deviate from the long-term
objective. For example, inflation may rise above its
objective at a time when real output is below poten-
tial and unemployment is rising. It would be difficult
or impossible in this situation for the Fed to ignore
the weakness in the real economy and act aggres-
sively to bring inflation quickly back to target.
Some have argued that precisely this possibility
makes an explicit inflation objective for the United
States impractical. I don’t find this objection partic-
ularly compelling. Especially if the Fed has previ-
ously established credibility, inflation may remain
above its objective for some time without undue
damage to the Fed’s credibility if the Fed is transpar-
ent regarding its medium-term strategy for bringing
inflation back to path. Even with established credi-
bility, explaining this strategy clearly and convinc-
ingly to market participants and the general public
would be challenging. Strategies and the accompa-
nying explanations will have to be tailored to each
case. In particular, the Fed may anticipate bringing
inflation back to the objective more quickly in some
cases than in others. Consequently, it may be useful
for the Fed to announce intermediate-term inflation
forecasts to assist the public in making financial
and business decisions during the transition back
to the long-term objective.
Beyond this, even if inflation is stable at or near
its long-term objective, unanticipated shocks may
push employment and output growth temporarily
away from their sustainable noninflationary rates.
Here, too, Fed transparency about its intentions will
help the public gauge how production, employment,
and interest rates will evolve in the medium term
as the economy adjusts to the shock. Transparency
is in the Fed’s interest as well since it can help build
confidence in the following: that, first, monetary
policy can be effective in dealing with temporary
departures of real activity from its long-term poten-
tial and, second, that the Fed has the competence
to exploit this capability. More generally, I believe
that the Fed’s expertise regarding the functioning
of the U.S. economy—while far from perfect—is
now of high enough quality that transparency of
our thinking about the economy’s medium-term
JULY/AUGUST 2002      163
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS Panel Discussionprospects can build public confidence and trust in
periods of economic stress. To be sure, actual devel-
opments may deviate from our announced expec-
tations in particular situations, but trust can be
maintained if the Fed provides reasonable explana-
tions for the deviations.
TRANSPARENCY OF THE FEDERAL
FUNDS RATE TARGET AND THE
DIRECTIVE “TILT”
Having dealt with longer-term and intermediate-
term issues, let me now make a few comments
about transparency as it relates to short-term policy
tactics: specifically, transparency regarding the
current federal funds rate target, the “tilt” of the
directive language, and the statement released to
the press after each Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) meeting. It is in this area that the greatest
progress has been made in increasing transparency
over the last decade. Since February 1994, the funds
rate target set at a particular FOMC meeting (previ-
ously released only after the next FOMC meeting)
has been announced shortly after adjournment of
the meeting where it is set. So markets now know
the current target. And the Committee has released
the tilt (or absence of a tilt) in the directive language
along with the current funds rate target since its
meeting on May 18, 1999. Previously, it too had
been released only after the next FOMC meeting.1
This increased instrument transparency, in my
view, is all to the good. I believe the immediate
release of the tilt language is especially useful. Again,
the effect of monetary policy is transmitted to the
economy not only through the current level of the
funds rate target but also through market expecta-
tions about the future level of the target, which are
reflected in the short-term yield curve. Market par-
ticipants are going to form these expectations in
any event. By announcing the tilt immediately, the
FOMC shares its best current estimate of emerging
economic conditions that might affect the direction
of any near- or intermediate-term change in the
funds rate target, which should increase the effi-
ciency with which markets form their expectations,
help prepare markets and the public for changes
in the target, and reduce short-term disruptions
caused by leaks. In particular, since markets know
the current tilt, they are better positioned to interpret
the likely policy implications of incoming current
economic data. For example, the release of strong
data after disclosure of an upside tilt in the directive
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language should increase the probability that long-
term rates will be bid upward in response. Conse-
quently, immediate disclosure of the tilt should
enable long-term interest rate adjustments to per-
form their stabilizing role in the economy more
effectively.
While, again, considerable progress has been
made in increasing the transparency of the Fed’s
short-term instrument settings, and its short-term
expectations regarding at least the direction of
future settings, in my view there is room for further
progress. In particular, there may be different views
about the extent to which a tilt in the directive in
one direction or the other commits or obliges the
Fed to a future funds rate change. To the degree
that markets interpret a tilt as committing the Fed
to future action, failure to take action may surprise
or “whipsaw” markets. It should be possible for the
Fed to mitigate this problem by emphasizing publicly
that a tilt only implies a greater likelihood that any
near- or intermediate-term change in the funds rate
will be in a particular direction, and is not a commit-
ment to any action. It might seem tempting to
consider eliminating the tilt in the formulation of
short-term policy to remove any confusion it may
produce. But such a reduction in transparency would
deprive the FOMC of the benefits of announcing
the tilt noted above. Moreover, beyond these bene-
fits, abandoning it would deprive the Committee of
a useful way to keep in touch with the strength of
its internal consensus regarding policy at any point
in time and a valuable supplementary tool for
reaching agreement on a funds rate target when
there is a significant divergence of views regarding
the appropriate level of the target.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the
language of the press statement announcing the
funds rate target and any tilt after each meeting also
influences market expectations regarding future
policy actions. This language is widely reported and
interpreted currently in media coverage of FOMC
meetings. In essence, the language in the statement,
1 Initially, the FOMC tilt statement referred to the likelihood of a future
increase or decrease in the targeted federal funds rate. In January 2000,
the Committee announced that it had adopted new language for this
portion of the statement. The new language describes the FOMC’s
assessment of the “balance of risks” with regard to heightened infla-
tionary pressures or economic weakness in the foreseeable future,
without reference to future policy actions. The objective of the change
was to avoid potential confusion regarding the implications of the tilt
announcement for future policy. In practice, however, financial market
participants continue to draw inferences from the announcement
regarding the likelihood of possible future policy actions.like the tilt language in the directive, is viewed by
market participants as an additional short-term
policy instrument. 
TESTIMONY AND SPEECHES
The role of the Fed’s explicit policy announce-
ments in shaping market expectations of future
policy actions is obviously important, but as anyone
even slightly interested in Fed policy is well aware,
public statements by individual FOMC members
(including Reserve Bank presidents who are not
currently voting Committee members) are at times
especially important. This is particularly so in today’s
environment where media coverage of these utter-
ances by cable television financial news channels,
instant e-mail transmission of market analysis, and
the like is much more extensive than even just a
few years ago. Obviously, the Fed Chairman’s
remarks in congressional testimony (including
answers to questions as well as prepared testimony),
his speeches, and his interviews are followed more
intensely than the comments of other FOMC partici-
pants, since the Chairman is clearly the most influ-
ential Committee member and only he speaks for
the Committee as a whole. At times, however, com-
ments of other participants can affect market expec-
tations, at least in the short run: for example, if a
comment is the Fed’s first public reaction to a new
economic report (particularly if the content of the
report was unanticipated by markets) or if the com-
ment comes at a time when markets are especially
uncertain about near-term policy prospects. Conse-
quently, we also receive our share of media attention.
Bill Poole and I and, I expect, all of our colleagues
at other Reserve Banks can tell stories about being
covered by several reporters even when making
speeches in fairly remote parts of our respective
Districts.
Some argue that this form of Fed transparency
may be counterproductive, at least at times, if the
views expressed in these comments seem incon-
sistent—particularly if they appear to conflict with
a recent FOMC decision or a public statement by the
Chairman. On occasion I have personally received
criticism and complaints from market professionals
and others when they have found my statements at
variance with other Fed statements or confusing in
some other way, and I will acknowledge that on a
few occasions my remarks may have briefly com-
plicated the formation of market expectations.
Over time, however, speeches and other public
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statements by individual FOMC participants provide
markets and the public with a more robust and
complete understanding of thinking inside the Fed
about current economic and financial conditions
and near-term prospects than that provided solely
by the policy announcements I just discussed. Also,
it is important to recognize that market analysts
are adept at filtering and appropriately weighting
press reports of individual FOMC participant remarks
in the context of the broad range of Fed public state-
ments from all sources. In short, I believe a convinc-
ing case can be made that the public remarks of
individual Reserve Bank presidents and other FOMC
participants increase the efficiency with which mar-
kets form short-term policy expectations.
I would offer one other—admittedly specula-
tive—note on this point. It is obvious, again, that the
Fed Chairman speaks with by far the most influential
voice among FOMC participants. It might appear
superficially that comments by other participants
that seem to be “off message” might create confu-
sion about the Fed’s intentions and undermine the
force of the Chairman’s statements. As I just sug-
gested, there might be a little of this from time to
time, but I doubt these instances are of much signifi-
cance. Again, markets are well aware of the much
greater weight of the Chairman’s statements and
discount the remarks of other FOMC participants
accordingly. Perhaps more importantly, public com-
mentary by other participants reinforces the Chair-
man’s credibility in the eyes of informed observers
of Fed policy, since they demonstrate that the Chair-
man leads, builds consensus among, and speaks
for a thoughtful, competent group of policy profes-
sionals who naturally have diverse views on specific
policy choices. If the public believed the Chairman
was conducting policy unilaterally, he or she would
be more vulnerable to an abrupt loss of public con-
fidence. This might not be a risk for the current
Chairman, who justifiably enjoys exceptionally
high public respect, but it could be a problem for a
future Chairman.
CONCLUSION
Again, I have enjoyed participating in this panel
discussion. This conference has addressed what is
clearly a crucial topic in understanding how mone-
tary policy affects the economy and how it might be
improved. The subject deserves continued research.
Thanks to this conference, I am confident it will
get it.166 JULY/AUGUST 2002
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